The Improbability of Russia Attacking the U.S. Post-U.S. Strikes on Syria

Given the current geopolitical climate, particularly with Russia’s focus on the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and its involvement in Syria, the likelihood of Russia attacking the U.S. following strikes on Syria is exceedingly low. Russia’s strategic and logistical constraints, combined with its cautious approach to conflict, make such a scenario highly improbable.

Strategic Implications

Firstly, Vladimir Putin is well aware of the immediate challenges he faces in Ukraine. The ongoing FUBAR (f**ked up beyond all recognition) situation is a significant distraction and drain on Russia’s resources and capabilities. Escalating tensions with the U.S. or other Western nations in the Middle East would serve to complicate an already precarious situation. Russia's involvement in Syria, while maintaining a significant presence, has been largely reactive and aimed at protecting its strategic interests rather than seeking to initiate a new front.

Logistical Limitations

The physical and logistical challenges Russia faces make a direct military engagement with the U.S. virtually impossible. Russia lacks the capacity to project significant military power across long distances, particularly those required to reach North America. Its navy, while formidable, is constrained by several critical factors:

Limited Naval Capability: The Russian fleet is largely limited to coastal and regional operations. Its pride and main carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, operates slowly and relies heavily on a constant support convoy, making it less of a strategic asset in distant theaters of war. Inadequate Supply Chains: Inland waterways and transport infrastructure often limit the mobility of Russia’s naval assets, especially in winter months and beyond the Black Sea region.

In essence, Russia’s military presence in the Middle East is more symbolic and reactive than a force capable of posing a serious threat to the U.S. beyond limited conventional warfare.

Strategic Consequences of War

Even in a non-nuclear scenario, the consequences for Russia would be dire. The Soviet Union’s strategic failure in the Gulf War and the Balkans demonstrated the vulnerabilities of a conventional military force against modern Western powers. Non-nuclear warfare against the U.S. would likely result in significant damage to Russia’s military infrastructure, morale, and strategic assets. The resulting attrition and lack of strategic gains would make any such engagement strategically unviable.

Nuclear Deterrence and Escalation

The implications of a nuclear conflict are even more catastrophic. If the U.S. supplies its NATO allies, particularly Ukraine, with weapons that pose a threat to Russia, a nuclear response would be highly likely. Given Russia’s robust nuclear arsenal, any provocation would almost certainly result in a strategic response aimed at neutralizing the threat to its security. A nuclear-first strike by Russia would target Ukraine and potentially extend to Europe and eventually the United States. The outcome would be devastating for both sides, with Russia likely losing much of its conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Human and Cultural Factors

Moreover, cultural and human dimensions further reduce the likelihood of direct military engagement. Personal relationships and shared experiences between Russians and Americans argue against such an escalatory path. Russian acquaintances and the positive cultural exchanges observed during anti-Putin protests indicate a level of mutual respect and understanding. The existence of Russian communities in the U.S., such as the one in Topeka, Kansas, demonstrates the complexity and varying nature of Russian-U.S. interactions. These factors suggest that any conflict would be more likely to stay dormant within specific contexts of strategic deterrence and containment.

Potential Escalation Through Subtler Means

Instead of a direct military engagement, potential escalations might occur through proxy conflicts or tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Stephanie ‘Steve’ Kerkam, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense and now a prominent geopolitical analyst, posits that limited tactical nuclear strikes in Europe could become a key factor if either side feels compelled to push the bounds of deterrence. Both sides, knowing the catastrophic risks involved, would likely employ limited, controlled actions to signal resolve and capacity without crossing the threshold of a full-scale conflict.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the combination of strategic constraints, logistical limitations, and a cautious approach to conflict significantly reduces the likelihood of Russia launching a direct attack on the U.S. after the U.S. strikes on Syria. Instead, any potential conflict is more likely to occur through limited, controlled proxy engagements or strategic nuclear deterrence. Understanding these factors is crucial for navigating the complex geopolitical landscape of the modern era.